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rMICHAEL DUMMETT ON SOCIAL CHOICE AND VOTING
MAURICE SALLES
Abstract. Michael Dummett worked on the theoretical aspects of aggregation of in-
dividual preferences and on the strategic aspects of voting theory. He also extended
Black’s analysis of single-peaked preferences for majority rule to the case of voting
games (majority games), oﬀering a greater ﬂexibility for the expression of voters’ pref-
erences. He is also with Donald Saari one of the major advocates of the use of Borda’s
rule in actual voting. In two books and a paper, he proposed many examples showing
the advantages and defects of many voting rules used in the world
At the beginning of the 1970’s, there has been an upsurge of the publications in social
choice and voting theory with, for instance, the books of Murakami (1968), Sen (1970),
Pattanaik (1971) and Fishburn (1973). On the contrary, the publications in this area were
quite rare in the 1950’s and the beginning 1960’s after the foundational works of Arrow
(1951, 1963) and Black (1958). In 1970, I just started my research for my doctoral dis-
sertation. I was particularly interested in the restrictions of individual preferences that
could guarantee the transitivity of the social preference and/or the existence of a ‘best’
element generated by some aggregation procedure. I was intrigued by a paper by Michael
Dummett and Robin Farquharson published in Econometrica in 1961. I was intrigued for
three reasons. Firstly, I had never heard of the authors. Secondly, in the ﬁrst pages of
the paper, what would become, more than ten years later, one of the most famous results
of the social choice literature, viz. the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, was conjectured
in passing. Thirdly, the used proof technique was ‘diﬀerent.’
1 Doing researches in so-
cial choice theory, I rapidly heard of Farquharson’s book (1969) and was very surprised
to discover in this book bibliography that Farquharson published a paper in French on
his equilibrium concept in the Comptes Rendus de l’Acad´ emie des Sciences as early as in
1955.
2 Incidentally, a recent paper by Michael Dummett (2002) is devoted to Farquhar-
son. It took me some time (probably a few years, after I started to develop an amateurish
interest in philosophy, particularly in analytic philosophy—surely a major disease for most
French ‘intellectuels’—) before I came to know that Michael Dummett was one of the great-
est living philosophers.
In 1984, a book by Dummett entitled Voting Procedures appeared. I think that this book
is one of the main works in voting theory and in the analysis of actual voting procedures—I
mean procedures used or usable in real life, political or else. A declared objective of this
book was to remedy a ‘deplorable situation,’ viz. that the theory of voting ‘was known
only to a small circle of people,’ excluding ‘politicians, national and local’ as well as, most
probably, ‘experts in political institutions and political theory.’ Voting Procedures was
not an easy book. I had the impression from discussions with Michael Dummett that
he thought the aforementioned objective had not been reached. On the other hand, it is
already a classic even if, precisely because its author is a philosopher, it has not been so far
Date: September 30, 2005.
1The originality of the proof technique is reminiscent of the proof used to show, given an acyclic binary
relation over a ﬁnite set of elements, the existence of maximal elements in this ﬁnite set. To the best of
my knowledge this was ﬁrst proved in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 1953) and rediscovered by
Sen (1970) and Pattanaik (1971).
2it was not exceptional at that time that important papers by English-speaking natives (and, for this
matter, also by Germans and Japaneses), particularly in mathematics, be published in French. These
days are, alas for me, over.
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widely read by the so-called ‘small circle of people.’ Principles of Electoral Reform (1997)
was surely written to reach the initial objective, and it is, I believe, totally successful.
Here is a book easy to read, even for laymen, and full of substance and wit. I am not
sure, however that in these times when electoral reforms are in order in many countries
or when groups of countries have to devise procedures (as in the European Union), it has
been read by politicians and journalists.
One may wonder why philosophers have been interested at all in social choice and voting
theory. On the one hand, social choice theory and welfare economics always had strong
links with moral philosophy and it is not a surprise that many philosophers contributed
to this area. It has also been the case that some great authors were at the same time
philosophers and economists. I can mention without trying to be exhaustive Adam Smith,
John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick. In our time, it is rather diﬃcult to ascertain that
Amartya Sen or John Broome are basically economists rather than philosophers. Sen
has published many of his recent papers in philosophical journals and some of his books
(1987, 2003) are obviously related to moral philosophy. Moreover, important philosophers
(professionally they are philosophers because they are or have been academics within de-
partments of philosophy in universities) made major contributions in social choice, from
diﬀerent perspectives. Let me mention Gibbard (1973), Davidson (1986), Gauthier (1986),
Griﬃn (1986), Jeﬀrey (1992), Suppes (1996), Nozick (1997). On the other hand, Michael
Dummett’s work is essentially devoted to social choice theory as a paradigm of voting,
in its practical and theoretical guise. In this sense, he is a real heir of another Oxford
logician: C. L. Dodgson (Lewis Carroll). It is a fact that today there are several logicians
working in this area (such as Mosh´ e Machover, Sven Ove Hansson or Harrie de Swart) and
that meetings are speciﬁcally organized to bring logicians together with game theorists
and social choice theorists.
In this essay, I will outline ﬁrst Dummett’s theoretical contribution. This includes an
original approach to the aggregation of preferences problem and an analysis of strategic
voting. It also includes what was the core of his 1961 paper co-authored with Robin
Farquharson, where a suﬃcient condition on individual preferences for the existence of a
solution to voting games is given. This condition is related to, but more general than,
Duncan Black’s single-peaked preferences. Then, I will describe some of Dummett’s work
on practical voting methods.
1. the impossibility of social welfare functions
I will ﬁrst recall the canonical version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. I will use what
are now rather standard deﬁnitions, notations etc.
Let X be a set of alternatives (options, social states, candidates, allocations of standard
microeconomic theory etc.). #X is the cardinal of X (the number of its elements when
X is ﬁnite). A binary relation  over X is a set of ordered pairs (x,y) with x and y in X,
i.e.,  is a subset of the Cartesian product X × X. I use the notation x  y rather than
(x,y) ∈. Intuitively x  y means in our context ‘x is as good as y.’ The asymmetric
component of , denoted by , meaning ‘is better than,’ is deﬁned by x  y if x  y and
¬y  x (¬ is the negation symbol). The symmetric component, denoted by ∼, meaning
‘there is an indiﬀerence between,’ is deﬁned by x ∼ y if x  y and y  x. The binary
relation  is reﬂexive if for all x ∈ X, x  x. It is complete if for all x, y ∈ X, x  y or
y  x (note that if  is complete, it is reﬂexive and that, in this case, x  y ⇔ ¬y  x).
It is transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ X, x  y and y  z ⇒ x  z. A binary relation which is
complete and transitive is a complete preorder. With X ﬁnite, a complete preorder ranked
the alternatives from a most preferred to a least preferred with possible ties.SOCIAL CHOICE AND VOTING 3
Let N be a ﬁnite set of individuals (economic agents, voters) of cardinal n, i.e., N =
{1,...,n}. Each individual i ∈ N has a preference over X given by a complete preorder
i. The aggregation question is about the construction of a social (collective, synthetic)
preference S (or in some cases a social choice) from a list of individual preferences (one
preference per individual).
Let Ord(X) be the set of complete preorders over X, Ord(X)0 be a subset of Ord(X),
and Bin(X) be the set of complete binary relations over X.
Deﬁnition 1. An aggregation function is a function from Ord(X)0n into Bin(X),
where Ord(X)0n is the Cartesian product of Ord(X)0 n times.
This means that the aggregation function f associates a complete (social) binary re-
lation S to a n-list (1,...,n) of (individual) complete preorders: f : (1,...,n) 7→S.
Deﬁnition 2. A social welfare function is an aggregation function for which Bin(X) =
Ord(X).
In this case, the sort of rationality required for the social preference is absolutely iden-
tical with the rationality we assumed for individuals. If we consider the simple case where
Ord(X)0 = Ord(X), #X = 3 and n = 3, the number of such functions is 1313
3
, which is a
number of the order of the positive integer 1 followed by more than 2400 zeros. Of course,
some of these functions are unappealing. Some of these unappealing characteristics are
excluded by a set of conditions. Arrow’s theorem asserts, in a way, that a given set of
appealing conditions had so drastically reduced the set of possible social welfare functions
that there is no one left! In the standard version of Arrow’s theorem there are four con-
ditions.
Condition U. Ord(X)0 = Ord(X).
This means that the domain of the function is unrestricted or universal (the only re-
striction being that the individual preferences are given by complete preorders; there is no
supplementary rationality assumed from the individuals). This condition will be discussed
in Section 3.
Condition I. Let (1,...,n) and (0
1,...,0
n) ∈ Ord(X)0n and a and b ∈ X. Sup-
pose that for each i ∈ N i |{a,b} =0
i |{a,b}, then S |{a,b} =0
S |{a,b} where




For a simple explanation, suppose that X is ﬁnite. Then, in the individual rankings
of the alternatives erase all alternatives except a and b. If what is left in the two n-lists
coincide, then the social ranking restricted to a and b must also coincide. Many rules,
including majority rule or for this matter, all rules where the social preference over two
alternatives is deﬁned from the individual preferences over these same two alternatives
will satisfy Condition I. On the other hand, all rules which are based on scores (the
simplest one being plurality rule used as a voting procedure in many countries, in partic-
ular in the United States and United Kingdom) violate this condition. This condition is
often called ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives,’ but it is rather unfortunate that a
condition of the same name with another meaning is also used in individual decision theory.
Condition P. Let (1,...,n) ∈ Ord(X)0n and a and b ∈ X. If a i b for all i ∈ N,
then a S b, where S is the asymmetric component of S= f(1,...,n).4 MAURICE SALLES
This says that the social preference respects unanimity. An interesting aspect of the
condition is that it excludes that the social welfare function be constant.
Condition DA. There is no individual i such that for any n-list (1,...,n) ∈
Ord(X)0n and any x,y ∈ X, x i y ⇒ x S y, where S is the asymmetric compo-
nent of S= f(1,...,n).
Such an individual is called a dictator. Note that to be a dictator you have to impose
(all) your strict preference to the society, i.e., i⊆S
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. If n ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 3, there is no social welfare
function satisfying Conditions U, I, P and DA.
In his book, Arrow introduced two other conditions. The following conditions are slight
modiﬁcations of the conditions he introduced in the 1951 version of his book with no con-
sequences on the results.
Condition MA. Let (1,...,n) and (0
1,...,0
n) ∈ Ord(X)0n and a,b ∈ X. Suppose
that for each i ∈ N, a i b ⇒ a 0
i b and a i b ⇒ a 0
i b. Then a S b ⇒ a 0
S b,
where S is the asymmetric component of S= f(1,...,n) and 0





This is a monotonicity assumption meaning that if a was socially preferred to b and if
a does not decline vis-` a-vis b in the preference scale of every individual, then a remains
socially preferred to b.
Condition NIA. For all x,y ∈ X, there is an n-list (1,...,n) ∈ Ord(X)0n for which
x S y, where S is the asymmetric component of S= f(1,...,n).
NIA means ‘non-imposition.’ This condition entails that a (strict) social preference
cannot be commanded by a moral or religious code. It is not diﬃcult to see that, given
Conditions U and I, Conditions MA and NIA imply Condition P.
In Voting Procedures (1984), Michael Dummett proposes another Arrovian impossi-
bility theorem. He keeps condition U and I and introduces variants (strengthenings for
the ﬁrst two and weakening for non-imposition) of Conditions DA, MA and NIA. The
following is a slight modiﬁcation of Dummett’s principle (I) (page 52), taking Condition
I into consideration.
Condition MD. Let (1,...,n) and (0
1,...,0
n) ∈ Ord(X)0n and a,b ∈ X. Suppose
that for each i ∈ N, a i b ⇒ a 0
i b and a i b ⇒ a 0
i b. Then a S b ⇒ a 0
S b and
a S b ⇒ a 0
S b, where S is the asymmetric component of S= f(1,...,n) and 0
S




Dummett’s monotonicity assumption diﬀers from Condition MA only by requiring that
if the social preference was a ∼S b, then it must remain so or become a S b.
Condition NID. There are two alternatives a,b ∈ X and an n-list (1,...,n) ∈
Ord(X)0n for which a S b, where S is the asymmetric component of S= f(1,...,n).
This condition is quite weak and its violation means that for every n-list and every
x and y the function socially ranks x and y at the same level: whatever the individual
preferences, there is a general social indiﬀerence.SOCIAL CHOICE AND VOTING 5
Condition DD. There is no individual i such that for some a,b ∈ X, for any n-list
(1,...,n) ∈ Ord(X)0n, a i b ⇒ a S b, where S is the asymmetric component of
S= f(1,...,n).
Such individuals could be called partial dictators. It is interesting to note that the
condition is quite stronger than Arrow’s non-dictatorship condition (it is probably very
diﬃcult to ﬁnd a ‘real’ Arrovian dictator; even the worst recent historic ﬁgures such as
Hitler, Stalin, Amin Dada, Bokassa or Milosevic were not Arrovian dictators, but one
can easily imagine that they were Dummettian partial dictators). Moreover, this kind of
condition can be found in Sen (1970) to describe liberalism (see Brunel and Salles (1998)
and Salles (2000)). Dummett’s no-partial-dictatorship condition is somewhere between
anonymity and Arrow’s no-dictatorship condition. Anonymity means that individuals
are treated equally. Mathematically if σ is a permutation over the set N of individuals,
f(σ(1),...,σ(n)) = f(1,...,n).
Dummett’s Impossibility Theorem. If n ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 3, there is no social
welfare function satisfying Condition U, I, NID,MD and DD.
A very nice feature of Dummett’s impossibility theorem is the simplicity of its proof.
There is no need to prove what Sen (1985) calls the ﬁeld expansion lemma, i.e., the
neutrality (equal treatment of alternatives) property generated by decisive sets (a subset
of n is decisive for a against b if a S b whenever we have a i b for all i in the subset).
2. Strategy-proof voting procedures
In my view, the six major pieces of modern social choice theory are at this time Arrow’s
theorem, Black’s single-peaked preferences analysis, Nash’s bargaining solution, Harsanyi’s
utilitarianism (1955), Sen’s liberalism theorem and Gibbard-Satterthwaite strategy-
proofness theorem (1973, 1975). Regarding this last theorem, a remarkable feature is
that it was very clearly stated (conjectured) in the Econometrica (1961) paper of Dum-
mett and Farquharson. Precisely, one can read
We cannot assume that each voter’s actual strategy will be determined uniquely by his prefer-
ence scale. This would be to assume that every voter votes “sincerely,” whereas it seems unlikely
that there is any voting procedure in which it can never be advantageous for any
voter to vote “ strategically,” i.e., non-sincerely.
A general proof of this conjecture was given by Gibbard only in 1973 and by Satterth-
waite in 1975. In Voting Procedures, Dummett provides a very interesting and (again)
‘diﬀerent’ proof of this major result. I will give here the standard version of the theorem
and indicates how Dummett’s version diﬀers from it.
First, X will be assumed to be ﬁnite and to simplify the presentation, I will consider
that the individuals’ preferences are given by linear orderings over X rather than complete
preorders. A linear order is an anti-symmetric complete preorder.  is anti-symmetric if
for all x,y ∈ X, x  y and y  x ⇒ x = y. This means that the alternatives are ranked by
the individuals without ties, like points on a line. Let Lin(X) be the set of linear orderings
over X.
Deﬁnition 3. A social choice function is a surjective function f from Lin(X)n to X.
The problem here is the selection of a single alternative. I need not in this essay to
introduce any restriction on the linear orderings that the individuals will indicate in the
selection procedure. The fact that f is surjective means that f(Lin(X)n) = X, i.e., for6 MAURICE SALLES
any alternative there is a n-list (1,...,n) ∈ Lin(X)n 3 whose value is this alternative.
Surjectivity is only here to remain as simple as possible. It is not a necessary condition.
Incidentally, the absence of surjectivity is rather diﬃcult to interpret in a voting context.
Deﬁnition 4. Individual i manipulates the social choice function in (1,...,n) ∈
Lin(X)n if there exists 0
i over X such that f(1,...,i−1,0
i,i+1,...,n) i f(1
,...,i−1,i,i+1,...,n).
If we suppose that the linear preferences 1,...,i,...,n are sincere, the deﬁnition
means that i by reporting a non-sincere preference can make the outcome be preferable
to him according to his sincere preference to the outcome that would have been selected
had he reported his sincere preference.
Condition NM. A social choice function f is said to be non-manipulable if there is
no i and no n-list (1,...,n) ∈ Lin(X)n such that i manipulates f in (1,...,n).
Condition DG. There is no individual i for which for all n-list (1,...,n) ∈ Lin(X)n,
f(1,...,n) i x for all x ∈ X − {f(1,...,n)}.
Such an individual could be called a Gibbardian dictator. In the case of a Gibbardian
dictator, the function selects systematically the alternative ranked ﬁrst by the dictator
(whatever the others’ preferences are).
Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s Theorem. If n ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 3, there is no social choice
function satisfying conditions NM and DG.
Dummett introduced a stronger form of non-dictatorship, again somewhere between
anonymity and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s version.
Condition DD
0
. There is no individual i and no alternative a such that for all n-list
(1,...,n) ∈ f−1({a}), f(1,...,n) i x for all x ∈ X − {f(1,...,n)}.
f−1({a} is the inverse image of {a} under f. Essentially, in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
framework, a dictator imposes as the collective choice the alternative that is ranked ﬁrst
in his preference ordering, whatever this alternative is. Dummett excludes this possibility
even for a single alternative, i.e., for every i and every alternative x, i is not able to impose
x to the society.
Dummett’s Strategy-Proofness Theorem. If n ≥ 2 and #X ≥ 3, there is no
social choice function satisfying conditions NM and DD
0
.
A remarkable characteristic of Dummett’s version is the proof. It is rather surpris-
ing that, coming from a logician, this proof has a geometrical (more precisely, graph-
theoretical) and topological aspect, with notions such as ‘region,’ ‘boundary,’ ‘path’ being
deﬁned and used systematically.
3. The core of voting games
As mentioned previously, the modern rebirth of social choice theory in the 1940’s is due
to the works of Arrow and Black. The main result due to Black concerns the majority
rule and the existence of a transitive social preference generated by this rule when the
individual preferences are appropriately restricted.
3Since indiﬀerence is excluded in linear orderings, I use the notation  rather than .SOCIAL CHOICE AND VOTING 7
Deﬁnition 5. The majority rule is an aggregation function for which for all x,y ∈ X
and all n-list (1,...,n) ∈ Ord(X)0n, x S y ⇔ #{i : x i y} > #{i : y i x} and
y S x otherwise.
Suppose there are three individuals 1, 2, and 3, and three alternatives a, b and c with
the following preferences: a 1 b 1 c, b 2 c 2 a and c 3 a 3 b. This means
that individual 1 prefers a to b, b to c and a to c. It is obvious that the majority rule
generates a S b, b S c and c S a. This is the Condorcet paradox. It indicates that
the majority rule is not a social welfare function if Condition U is satisﬁed (all the other
conditions introduced in Section 1 are obviously satisﬁed). Black introduced a condition
on the set of individual preferences called single-peakedness. Black considered that the set
of alternatives was the real line (or more exactly a part of it). Individuals had a preference
represented by a curve with a unique maximum strictly increasing up to the maximum
and strictly decreasing from the maximum. He demonstrated that the median maximum
was the alternative selected by the majority rule, i.e., using this rule, was a point socially
preferred to every other point. This is a famous result of Public Choice called ‘the theorem
of the median voter’ (not always attributed to Black!). Arrow translated this condition in
his set-theoretic framework.
Deﬁnition 6. Let {a,b,c} ⊆ X. A set of complete preorders  over X satisﬁes the
condition of single-peakedness over {a,b,c} if either a ∼ b and b ∼ c or there is one of the
three alternatives, say b, such that b  a or b  c .
Let BL(X) denote the set of complete preorders over X such that the condition of
single-peakedness is satisﬁed for all {x,y,z} ⊆ X.
Black’s Theorem. If Ord(X)0 = BL(X) and if, for any {x,y,z} ⊆ X, the number
of individuals for which ¬(x ∼i y and y ∼i z) is odd, the majority rule is a social welfare
function.
This only means that the social preference is transitive. 4 With three alternatives,
there are 13 complete preorders and 8 single-peaked complete preorders. Single-peakedness
essentially means that among the three alternatives there is one which is never the (strictly)
worst. There is an interesting and intuitively meaningful geometrical representation. If




































Figure 1. Black’s single-peakedness condition over {a,b,c}
When the alternatives a, b or/and c are at the same horizontal level, this means that
there is an indiﬀerence between them, and when one of the alternatives x ∈ {a,b,c} is
vertically above y ∈ {a,b,c}, this means x  y. a, b and c are linearly ordered a being on
the left, b in the center and c on the right. It is then very easy to interpret the admissible
(single-peaked) preferences from a political viewpoint, for instance when a, b and c are
candidates to an election.
4Incidentally, we can avoid this condition of oddity if we only require that the asymmetric component
of S, S, be transitive (see Sen (1970) and Sen and Pattanaik (1969)).8 MAURICE SALLES
In voting games, coalitions, i.e., non-empty subsets of the set of individuals N are a
priori endowed with power. This power can be, as in the case of symmetric (anonymous)
games, deﬁned by a number of individuals, called a quota q (for instance q > n/2).
Deﬁnition 7. A voting game is an ordered pair G = (N,W) where W ⊆ 2N − ∅ and
W satisﬁes the following monotonicity property:
C1 ∈ W and C1 ⊆ C2 ⇒ C2 ∈ W.
A voting game G is proper if C ∈ W ⇒ N −C 6∈ W. It is strong if C 6∈ W ⇒ N −C ∈ W.
W is the set of winning (powerful) coalitions. A voting game with quota q ≤ n (or
q-game) is deﬁned by C ∈ W if #C ≥ q. With n = 9, the q-game with q = 5 is proper
and strong and the q-game with q = 6 is only proper.
We can associate to a voting game G an aggregation function f.
Deﬁnition 8. A voting game of aggregation is an aggregation function f for which for
all x,y ∈ X and all n-list (1,...,n) ∈ Ord(X)0n, x S y ⇔ there exists a C ∈ W such
that for all i ∈ C, x i y, and y S x otherwise. 5
Given a voting game of aggregation, we can now deﬁne the core associated with a n-list
(1,...,n).
Deﬁnition 9. The core of the voting game of aggregation f associated with the n-list
(1,...,n) ∈ Ord(X)0n, denoted Cor(f,(1,...,n)), is the set of the maximal elements
of X for the binary relation S, i.e., Cor(f,(1,...,n)) = {x ∈ X : (6 ∃y ∈ X)y S x}
In 1961, Dummett and Farquharson introduced an extended version of single-peakedness.
Deﬁnition 10. Let {a,b,c} ⊆ X. A set of complete preorders  over X satisﬁes the
condition of extended single-peakedness over {a,b,c} if there is one of the three alterna-
tives, say b, such that b  a or b  c .
Let DF(X) denote the set of complete preorders over X such that the condition of
extended single-peakedness is satisﬁed for all {x,y,z} ⊆ X.
Dummett and Farquharson’s Theorem. Let X be ﬁnite and f be any proper voting
game of aggregation. Then for all n-list (1,...,n) ∈ DF(X)n, Cor(f,(1,...,n)) 6= ∅.6
As seen in Figure 2, for a three-alternative subset, the extended single-peakedness con-
dition adds two complete preorders to the 8 complete preorders of Figure 1. This could
appear as only a slight amelioration, contrary to what Dummett and Farquharson wrote
in the abstract of their paper:
5There is no need to have a complete social preference. It is supposed here mainly because we previously
deﬁned aggregation functions as having values that are complete binary relations.
6In fact, Dummett and Farquharson considered a majority game deﬁned by x S y if #{i ∈ N : x i
y} > n/2 or #{i ∈ N : x i y} = n/2 and x 1 y. In case of equality, individual 1 plays a speciﬁc rˆ ole
(like a president in a committee, for instance). This deﬁnes a proper and strong voting game of aggregation
with S obviously complete. Then they proved the existence of a maximum element (called a top), i.e.,
the existence of a x such that x S y for all y ∈ X. The formulation I gave is essentially due to Nakamura
(1975). Salles and Wendell (1977) used the similarity between Dummett and Farquharson’s condition and
quasi-concavity of utility functions in dimension 1 to extend some of Nakamura’s results. On the other
hand, Pattanaik (1971) used an analysis very similar with Dummett and Farquharson’s analysis, with the
same kind of proof method, for conditions extending Black-type of conditions—for instance look at Figure
1 upside down.SOCIAL CHOICE AND VOTING 9
A condition on the preferences, substantially weaker than one postulated by D. Black, is
shown to be suﬃcient for “stability” in such games.
But I can explain why they wrote this. Firstly, a reduction from 13 to 8 is quite diﬀerent
from a reduction from 13 to 10. Secondly, when we try to give an intuitive meaning to
single-peakedness, as in the case of the left-right political spectrum mentioned above, the
elimination of these two complete preorders is totally unrealistic. These two preferences








Figure 2. Supplementary preferences for extended single-peakedness
On the other hand, the three missing complete preorders, as shown in Figure 3, do




















Figure 3. Excluded preferences
4. Voting procedures in practice
Nowadays, social choice theorists favour two voting methods that are rarely used in
practice: the Borda count and approval voting. Both have interesting features and both
have active and famous proponents, Steve Brams and Peter Fishburn for approval voting
(see Brams and Fishburn (1983)), Peter Emerson, Donald Saari, and, May I venture?,
Michael Dummett for the Borda count (see Emerson (1998), Saari (1995, 2001). Both
procedures are simple (can be easily understood by the voters) and need not diﬃcult
computations. In the most satisfying theoretical version of the Borda count, the voters
give in their ballot paper a complete ranking of the candidates with no ties. If there are
k candidates, k − 1 points are given to the candidate ranked ﬁrst, k − 2 to the candidate
ranked second, etc. and no point to the candidate ranked last. For each candidate, the
points are added and the social preference is based on the points attributed by the voters
to the candidates: the candidate ranked ﬁrst is the candidate who has obtained the greater
total of points etc. With approval voting, voters vote for as many candidates as they wish.
If there are k candidates they can vote for all k candidates (though this will have no eﬀect
on the collective result, exactly as if they voted for none), or for k − 1 candidates or...
for only one candidate. The candidates are then collectively ranked according to the total
number of votes they got. Of course, as these procedures give a collective ranking, they can
easily be used to select one or more candidates. Surprisingly, many people interested in
voting procedures, believing that it is a rather easy mathematical exercise and imagining
that they are good at elementary mathematics, either do not know these procedures—
but I cannot believe it—or have the greatest contempt for them. Many of these people
are actively trying to impose the alternative vote in the case of the selection of a single
outcome or the single transferable vote in the case of the selection of several outcomes.7
7After the April and May 2002 Presidential elections in France, several articles appeared in Le Monde
in which a French economist at the MIT I have never heard of as yet proposed a variant of the alternative10 MAURICE SALLES
When voters have to rank all the candidates, the alternative vote is similar with the
positive elimination procedure. In the case of positive voting, an outcome is eliminated
at the ﬁrst stage if it stands at the head of the ranking on the fewest ballots. Then, the
rankings are reduced by deleting the eliminated candidate and the same process is used for
the reduced rankings. The process is continued until we are left with a unique outcome. In
case of equality at some stage, some tie-breaking procedure is used (for instance, the elim-
inated outcome is that which stands lowest on some individual’s list). A dual procedure,
the negative elimination procedure, eliminates outcomes which most frequently stands at
the bottom of a ranking. Advocates of the alternative vote procedure generally favoured it
on the grounds of fairness to the voters (these advocates speak of wasted vote (Dummett
(1997, Chapter 10)). Incidentally, Dummett emphasizes the fact that the fairness criteria
should concern ﬁrst outcomes, rather than voters. Regarding fairness to the outcomes, he
considers three principles. (1) If x is a unique majority maximum (considered as least as
good as every other outcome by a majority), x is the fairest outcome. (2) If there is a
maximum, no outcome can be fair unless it is a maximum. (3) No outcomes can be fair
if it has a lower majority number than some other outcomes (the majority number of any
outcome x is the number of other outcomes y for which a majority considers x as least as
good as y). Consider the following example: there are three candidates a, b and c; 35%
of the voters ranked them acb (meaning a ﬁrst, c second and b third), 33% ranked them
bca, and 32% cab. Under the alternative vote procedure (and the French run oﬀ system),
c is eliminated. But in pairwise contests, we can see that c is preferred to a (the winner)
by 65% of the voters, and preferred to b by 67%. It is a very large ‘Condorcet winner’
(a maximum in my previous terminology, or a top in Dummett’s words). Furthermore,
the alternative vote procedure (and again the French run-oﬀ system) is a non-monotonic
procedure. Consider the same kind of example. Suppose 35% of the voters rank the three
candidates abc, 33%, bca, and 32% cab. a is the winner. Now suppose that for some reason
(for instance, an irregularity), the vote has to be started again and the ranking are 37%
abc, 31% bca, and 32% cab (there has been, for instance, a change of mind of some of the
people who had previously the ranking bca in favour of the ranking abc. Then the winner
is c in spite of the fact that more voters ranked a, the former winner, ﬁrst (Dummett
(1997, pp 99-103). One might wonder how the alternative vote procedure can still have
advocates, once these major ﬂaws are revealed.
Regarding the supposed fairness to the voters of the alternative voting procedure, Dum-
mett (1984, pp 173-174) rightly observes:
It is no excuse for having ignored the later choices of the supporters of the eventually success-
ful outcome that those supporters can have no complaint... The second and later choices of a
voter who has the misfortune to rank ﬁrst an outcome that remains live up to the ﬁnal stage of
the assessment, but is then defeated, are likewise neglected; and in this case there is not even a
fallacious argument to be oﬀered in justiﬁcation.
The Borda count has a major drawback (or is it?): it is not a majority procedure.
This is related to the fairness mentioned above and to the condition of independence of
Section 1. Though this condition is implicitly included in the fairness to the outcomes I
just described, Dummett is not certain of its relevance. He writes (Dummett (1984, p. 52)):
All but one of (Arrow’s) conditions is a minimal requirement for the rule embodied in the
social welfare function to be in the least reasonable. One of them, however, is not: Arrow calls it
the principle of ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’.
vote as a solution to the voting problems met in France. He apparently did not notice the major defects
of alternative vote, which are comparable with the major defects of the used French procedure (majority
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Consider an election with ten candidates x1,...,x10 and suppose that 50.0001% of the
voters ranked these candidates from x1 to x10 in the natural order and 49.9999% ranked
them x2 ﬁrst, then x3,..., then x10, the last being x1. According to the fairness criteria x1
must be chosen. But it is rather obvious (at least to me) that x2 is the best candidate.
Among the new rules proposed by Dummett, one is a composite which he calls the ma-
jority number procedure (Dummett(1984),p 178):
The tellers will compute, from the voters’ lists, the majority numbers of all the outcomes...
Having announced these, they will declare successful an outcome having a higher majority number
than any other. If two or more outcomes tie as having the highest majority number, they will
then compute and announce the preference scores of these outcomes, that one with the highest
preference score being declared successful.
On the one hand, given the fairness criteria, this procedure is the best that one can
imagine. On the other hand, it has the same drawback as the preference score proce-
dure (the Borda count): it can select a majority-dominated outcome. Furthermore, in
this case, if the tellers have to divulge all the information, the voters will know that the
chosen outcome is majority-dominated. Consequently, Dummett thinks that the majority
number procedure is to be avoided, “except by voters who are highly self-disciplined and
appreciate the importance of knowing no more about how the voting has gone than they
need to know”.
It is well known and easy to see that the Borda count is highly manipulable. But,
of course, in large elections, manipulation by a single individual (i.e., the successful mis-
representation of his preference) is nearly null, and manipulation by a group necessitates
transfers of information by communication that are rather hypothetical. Dummett (1998)
addresses another type of manipulation with the Borda count: the agenda manipulation.
A classical example is the introduction, in order to favour a candidate x, of a new candi-
date y ranked on every voter’s preference scale immediately below x. Dummett proposes
two ways to correct this.
In the case of elections with many possible outcomes, Dummett (1984, 1997) proposes
new procedures. He is particularly interested in rules insuring the representation of minori-
ties. He is rather critical of the single transferable vote procedure (STV). This procedure
is in use in Eire, Northern Ireland, Malta, and, I must add, the American Mathematical
Society. The rationale for this procedure rests again on the notion of wasted vote. But
Dummett clearly explains why
Most of the advantages advertised for STV are illusory... Its disadvantages are great: it is
complex for the tellers to operate, it is almost impossible to explain accurately, and its eﬀects
upon the outcome are often arbitrary. Its outstanding merit is the protection that it gives to
minorities (Dummett (1984), p 284).
He then proposes a new method called QPS (Q for quota, and PS for preference score).
Voters have not to rank all the candidates, but they do provide a ranking. A voter is
said to be solidly committed to a set of candidates if he includes every candidate in the
set in his ranking, and ranks each of them higher than any candidate not in the set. The
assessment proceeds by stages and will terminate as soon as k seats are ﬁlled.
At stage 1, the tellers will determine whether there are any candidates listed ﬁrst by more than
1/(k +1) of the total n of voters: if so, they immediately qualiﬁed for election. If seats remain to
be ﬁlled, the preference scores of all candidates not qualifying at stage 1 will then be calculated.
At stage 2, the ballot papers will be scrutinized to see if there is any pair of candidates, neither of
whom qualiﬁed at stage 1, to whom more than n/(k+1) voters are solidly committed: if so, that
member of the pair with the higher preference score now qualiﬁes for election. If seats remain to12 MAURICE SALLES
be ﬁlled, the tellers will proceed to stage 3, at which they will consider sets of three candidates,
none of whom has already qualiﬁed. If more than n/(k + 1) voters are solidly committed to such
trio, that one with the highest preference score qualiﬁes for election... If there still remains seats
to be ﬁlled after all the qualifying stages have been completed, they will be ﬁlled at the ﬁnal stage
by those candidtaes having the highest preference scores out of those who have not yet qualiﬁed
(Dummett (1984, p 284)).
Dummett shows that QPS retains the quality of STV in minorities representation, but
is superior to STV in every other respect, in particular, simplicity and fairness. He does
not pretend it is the best voting method, but that it is better than STV. “ The question
what is the best electoral system is of great complexity, and does not belong exclusively
to the theory of voting”.
5. conclusion
It is very diﬃcult to convey the richness of the contribution of Michael Dummett to
social choice and voting theory and to the practical voting procedures. This essay is only
a brief assessment of this richness. What I think is particularly remarkable is that he
contributed to three of what I considered above are the six main topics in the area and
that he is mainly, after all, a great philosopher and not primarily a social choice theorist.
In French ‘hobby’ is violon d’Ingres. I do not know whether Ingres, surely a great painter,
was a good violinist. However, I am sure that Michael Dummett is a great social choice
theorist.
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